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### **Evidence-Based Biosafety**

#### MEACB 2017

8th Meeting of the European Advisory Committees on Biosafety in the field of contained use and deliberate release of GMOs

Liège, 23 November 2017

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**INTRO** 

#### EVIDENCE-BASED BIOSAFETY

**Definition?** 

"Biosafety based on substantiation and facts"

Challenges?



INTRO



INTRO

#### **EVIDENCE-BASED BIOSAFETY:**

-Prevent decision based on obsolete knowledge gained during education or expertise without practical experiences

-Guarantees a pragmatic decision based on the most up-to-date and best knowledge

Bottleneck? >>> Data availability



INTRO

#### **SBB & EVIDENCE-BASED BIOSAFETY:**

Creating scientific data on containment measures based on experience, literature studies and sectoral consultation (if possible);

http://www.biosafety.be/CU/EN/Tools\_RA\_RM.html

Recently with own research data:

- Airtightness
- Classification of organisms
- Education with lab practices on biological agents
- Fumigation
- Bio-incidents, Bio-accidents and laboratory-acquired infections



**AIRTIGHTNESS** 

#### METHODOLOGY:

- blower door test at 50 Pa pressure difference
- Different constructions/renovations of high containment facilities:
  - New construction type BSL3 laboratory
  - Box-in-a-box type BSL3 laboratory
  - Conventional renovation type BSL3 laboratory
  - Superficial renovation type BSL3 animal facility





**AIRTIGHTNESS** 

#### n<sub>50</sub> (mean) [h<sup>-1</sup>]

- L3 1. New construction 0,4 2. Box-in-a-box renovation 0,7 3. Conventional renovation 4,0
- 4. Superficial renovation 0,4 A3

Norm for passive residential buildings:  $n_{50} = 0.6 h^{-1}$ 



#### **AIRTIGHTNESS**

#### **OBSERVED AIR LEAKS:**

- Double-door autoclave
- Electrical outlets & utilities tubing
- Hatches
- No appropriate outer envelope





**AIRTIGHTNESS** 

#### **CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATION:**

- 3 of the 4 high containment facilities showed a good level of airtightness
- Similair sources of air leaks
- Inform building contractors

>>> lab with high airtightness makes decontamination by fumigation more easy!

More info see <u>www.biosafety.be</u>; <u>http://www.biosafety.be/PDF/2016\_Coppens\_Willemarck\_AirtightnessReport.pdf</u> Colleague: Dr. Fanny Coppens



FUMIGATION

#### n<sub>50</sub> (mean) [h<sup>-1</sup>]

1. New construction 0,4

2. Box-in-a-box renovation 0,7 (126m<sup>2</sup>)

3. Conventional renovation 4,0 (152m<sup>2</sup>)

4. Superficial renovation 0,4

Norm for passive residential buildings:  $n_{50} = 0.6 h^{-1}$ 



#### FUMIGATION

	Reduction rate by fumigation type HPV (Tree-fold analysis)		1E4 1E5 1E6
	Box-in-a-box renovation [126 m <sup>2</sup> ; n <sub>50</sub> : 0.7/h]	Conventional renovation [154 m², n <sub>50</sub> : 4.0 /h]	Apex VPHP Discs Tri-Scale BI G. stearothermophilus #12980 Lot P1955 Exp 2016-04-30 (US Patent # 5,856,118)
on the bench	10 <sup>6</sup>	10 <sup>6</sup>	•
inside open BSC	10 <sup>6</sup>	10 <sup>5</sup>	
inside closed cupboard	n.a.	<104	
under / behind	10 <sup>6</sup>	104	
highest spot	10 <sup>6</sup>	104	
controls	ОК	OK	



**FUMIGATION** 

#### 12

#### **CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATION:**

- Airtightness is an important parameter for successful fumigation but is not absolute
- Validate the fumigation process before first use

More info available soon (submitted Applied Biosafety) and colleague: Dr. Fanny Coppens



#### EDUCATION WITH LAB PRACTICES ON BIOLOGICAL AGENTS

#### METHODOLOGY

- Preliminary study with the help of a checklist with biosafety aspects.
- 15 Flemish institutes (universities, colleges and other scientific institutes).
- 20 teaching activities with contained use of GMOs and/or pathogens.
- Contact with biosafety officer, educator, prevention advisor, occupational health officer and exploitant (CEO, Director, ...).
- Announced visits during the lab practices.



http://www.sbspgi.edu.in/departments\_sbspgi.php?pg=microbiology



EDUCATION WITH LAB PRACTICES ON BIOLOGICAL AGENTS

### FOUR SPECIFIC CATEGORIES EVALUATED (THEMATIC EVALUATION)

- Quality of the risk assessment (RA) performed.
- Use of personal protective measures.
- Inactivation of biologically contaminated material and waste.
- Training



#### EDUCATION WITH LAB PRACTICES ON BIOLOGICAL AGENTS

#### **IDENTIFIED AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT**

- Awareness of the biological risks among the students.
- Separation between personal items and used micro-organisms.
- Storage and release of the lab coats & biological waste.
- Used micro-organisms
- Technical characteristics of the lab.
- Compliance with containment measures (e.g. PPE, BSC,...) imposed in the permit (or authorisation).

More info see <u>www.biosafety.be</u>; <u>http://www.biosafety.be/ODW/ODW\_Rapport\_onderwijs\_NL.pdf</u> http://www.biosafety.be/ODW/ODW\_Aanvullende\_informatie.pdf</u> [DUTCH]; <u>http://www.biosafety.be/ODW/ODW\_Addendum\_FR.pdf</u> [FRENCH]

Colleague: Dr. Emilie Descamps



#### CLASSIFICATION OF BIOLOGICAL AGENTS

Classification lists should ideally be dynamic and updated in the light of increased scientific knowledge, by

- 1. literature
- 2. contacting experts via
  - 1. online platform >>> transparent, standardized and reproducible one health approach
  - 2. face to face >>> to ultimately test the findings from the objective online platform
- 3. auto-control by the user

More info see <u>www.biosafety.be</u>; <u>http://www.biosafety.be/RA/Class/ClassBEL.html</u>; publication on influenza will be available soon Colleague: Dr. Aline Baldo



### BIO-INCIDENTS, BIO-ACCIDENTS & LABORATORY ACQUIRED INFECTIONS

#### **BIO-INCIDENTS**

« All irregularities that occur while handling GMOs or pathogenic organisms in a bio-containment facility »

#### ► BIO-ACCIDENT

« means any incident involving a <u>significant and unintended release</u> of GMOs or pathogenic organisms in the course of their handling in a bio-containment facility which <u>could present an immediate or delayed</u> <u>hazard to human health or the environment</u>»

### LABORATORY-ACQUIRED INFECTIONS (LAIS)

« All <u>direct or indirect human infections</u> with or without the onset of symptoms following exposure to <u>pathogenic organisms in a bio-containment facility</u>»



#### BIO-INCIDENTS, BIO-ACCIDENTS & LABORATORY ACQUIRED INFECTIONS

• Every accident can be seen as lessons learnt

▶ Near-misses have as much a high value of lessons learnt.



http://healthsafetyupdates.blogspot.be/2015/07/toolbox-talk-incident-accident-and.html



### **BIO-INCIDENTS, BIO-ACCIDENTS & LABORATORY ACQUIRED INFECTIONS**

### **WHY**?

#### Checking a near thing can prevent the real thing The Swiss cheese model of accident causation (James Reason)



https://cursos.campusvirtualsp.org/repository/coursefilearea/file.php/19/Content2015/12 Patient Safety /Patient safety2015.html





#### BIO-INCIDENTS, BIO-ACCIDENTS & LABORATORY ACQUIRED INFECTIONS

#### ▶ ABSOLUTE OR RELATIVE NUMBERS?

What is the added value to work with relative numbers compared to absolute numbers?



### BIO-INCIDENTS, BIO-ACCIDENTS & LABORATORY ACQUIRED INFECTIONS

### ABSOLUTE OR RELATIVE NUMBERS?

Relative numbers of accidents and near-misses can be seen as a risk Incidence quotation. A quotation of the risk developed within a specified period of time (workload) or for fixed amount of positive diagnostic samples.

>> divided into different manipulation and or containment measures >>> to identify more risky manipulations >>> to evaluate effectiveness of containment measures and finally to more pragmatic biosafety.



#### BIO-INCIDENTS, BIO-ACCIDENTS & LABORATORY ACQUIRED INFECTIONS

#### LAI Incidence R&D / 1000 hours of manipulation

	Technicians	N-value (workload)
Shigella bacteria	6.295	3
Salmonella bacteria	1.820	6
Herpes virus	0.367	2
Campylobacter	0.212	2
Recombinant viral vector		4

#### LAI Incidence Diagnostics / 1000 positive samples

		N-value (workload)
Mycobacterium tuberculosis	13.916	4
HIV	8.814	3
Salmonella bacteria	3.503	8
Shigella bacteria	2.988	6
Dermatophyte	1.944	9
Campylobacter spp.	0.045	6



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Outliers can be linked to a 'sub'optimal risk assessment and/or management due to

-lack of knowledge?
-lack of compliance with inadequate personal protective equipments (masks, BSCs,...)?



#### BIO-INCIDENTS, BIO-ACCIDENTS & LABORATORY ACQUIRED INFECTIONS

#### QUALITY OF DATA?

Today:

Via surveys, biased in terms of misinterpretations Via literature, biased by selective outcome reporting



### BIO-INCIDENTS, BIO-ACCIDENTS & LABORATORY ACQUIRED INFECTIONS

How to create more relative data on bio-incidents & accidents?

>> focus on monitoring bio-accidents and its (internal) registration

>>> to identify LAIs, releases,...

- >> provide a user-friendly and centralized blame free platform for reporting near-misses & accidents >>> to collect the necessary details for 'lessons learnt'
- >> provide guidance in the legal framework regarding notification requirements
- >> create a system to capture workload
  - >>> to convert your absolute data to relative data at workload level

>>>> to identify outliers over time and mutual

Ideally through a legal framework...

More info see <u>www.biosafety.be</u>; <u>http://www.biosafety.be/CU/LAI/Intro\_LAI.html</u>



ABSOLUTE

RELATIVE

# **Evidence-Based Biosafety**

Conclusion

### Our goal:

Increase awareness of biological risks during contained use activities by more "evidence-based-biosafety"

>> research on topics of interest
>> an annual report about (notified) bio-incidents in Belgium + communication to the competent authorities and the community (with respect for any confidentiality)
>> 5 yearly LAI survey extended with bio-accidents / biosafety in general
>> development of tools to quantify biological risks
(workload registration, follow up pathogens, bio-incident platform,..)

to gain well substantiated insight into possible biological risk so as to provide the biosafety community with knowledge and tools which can enhance biological safety in pragmatic way.



### Questions

- **Project Airtightness** is financially supported by the Flemish, Walloon and Brussels-capital regions (DO, DGARNE & IBGE- BIM)

- **Project Fumigation** is financially supported by the Flemish, Walloon and Brussels-capital regions (DO, DGARNE & IBGE-BIM)

- **Project Classification of Micro-organisms** is financially supported by the Flemish, Walloon and Brussels-capital regions (DO, DGARNE & IBGE-BIM)

- **Project Education with risk of exposure to biological agents** is financially supported by the Flemish Agency for Care and Health, Department Prevention & the Flemish, Walloon and Brussels-capital regions (DO, DGARNE & IBGE-BIM)

- **Project Bio-incidents, Bio-accidents and LAIs** is financially supported by the Flemish Agency for Care and Health, Department Prevention & the Flemish, Walloon and Brussels-capital regions (DO, DGARNE & IBGE-BIM) & COGEM



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Contained use of activities involving GMOs and/or pathogens: **contained.use@wiv-isp.be** Agro-food/feed GMOs and medicinal GMOs: **bac@wiv-isp.be** Secretariat of the Biosafety Advisory Council: **bac@wiv-isp.be** The Biosafety Clearing-House of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety: **bbch@wiv-isp.be** Any other information: **sbbinfo@wiv-isp.be** 







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