Biosecurity - References

A Baldo, A Leunda, CD Do Thi, D Breyer, K Pauwels, S Welby, B Van Vaerenbergh, P Herman (2013) Biosafety Risk Assessment and Management of Laboratory-derived Influenza A (H5N1) Viruses Transmissible in Ferrets. Applied Biosafety 18(1):6-17

Breyer D, Brosius B, De Schrijver A, Do Thi CD, Goossens M, Leunda A, Pauwels K, Sneyers M, Van Droegenbroeck C, Van Vaerenbergh B, Verheust C, Herman P. The Scientific Institute of Public Health, Belgian focal point for Biosafety. 1990-2010: 20 years of risk assessment of GMOs and pathogens. ISBN 9789074968287. Ref : D/2010/2505/43

Bubela T, Hagen G and Einsiedel E (2012). Synthetic biology confronts publics and policy makers: challenges for communication, regulation and commercialization, Trends in Biotechnology; 30(3): 132-7.

Cello J, Paul AV, Wimmer E (2002a) Chemical synthesis of poliovirus cDNA: generation of infectious virus in the absence of natural template. Science; 297:1016-8.

Cello P, Paul AV, Wimmer E (2002b) Vaccines should be kept even if polio is wiped out. Nature; 418: 915.

Devaux CA (2015) The hidden face of academic researches on classified highly pathogenic microorganisms. Infection, Genetics and Evolution 29: 26-34.

de Vriend H (2006) Constructing Life. Early social reflections on the emerging field of synthetic biology. Rathenau Institute.

Duprex WP, Casadevall A (2014) Editorial: Falling down the Rabbit Hole: aTRIP Toward Lexiconic Precision in the "Gain-of-Function" Debate. Mbio 5(6).

Duprex WP, Fouchier RAM, Imperiale MJ, Lipsitch M, Relman DA (2015) Gain-of-function experiments: time for a real debate. Nature Reviews Microbiology 13(1):58-64.

Gibson DG, Benders GA, Andrews-Pfannkoch C, Denisova EA, Baden-Tillson H, Zaveri J, Stockwell TB, Brownley A, Thomas DW, Algire MA, Merryman C, Young L, Noskov VN, Glass JI, Craig Venter J, Hutchison CA, III, Smith HO. Complete Chemical Synthesis, Assembly, and Cloning of a Mycoplasma genitalium Genome. Science 2008;319(5867):1215-1220.

Grunow R, Ippolito G, Jacob D, Sauer U, Rohleder A et al., (2014) Benefits of a European project on diagnostics of highly pathogenic agents and assessment of potential “dual uses” issues. Frontiers in Public Health 2(199):1-11.

Inglesby TV, Henderson DA (2012) Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science. A decade in biosecurity. Introduction. Biosecur. Bioterror. 10, 5.

Jacobsen KX, Mattison K, Heisz M, Fry S (2014) Biosecurity in emerging life sciences technologies, a Canadian public health perspective. Frontiers in Public Health 2(198):1-3.

Jackson RJ et al. (2001) Expression of a mouse interleukin-4 by a recombinant ectromelia virus upresses cytolytic lymphocyte responses and overcomes genetic resistance to mousepox. Journal of Virology 75:1205-12010.

Jernigan JA (2001) Bioterrorism-Related Inhalational Anthrax: The First 10 Cases Reported in the United States. Emerging Infectious Diseases 7, 933-944.

Kaplan G, Lubinski J, Dasgupta A, Racaniello VR (1985) In vitro synthesis of infectious poliovirus RNA. PNAS 82(24): 8424-8428.

Miller S and Selgelid MJ. Ethical and philosophical consideration of the dual-use dilemma in the biological sciences. Dordrecht NE, Springer 2008. Report prepared by the Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics, at the  Australian National University for the Australian Department of Prime Minister an Cabinet National Security Science and Technology  Unit, November 2006.

NSABB (2010) Addressing biosecurity concerns related to Synthetic Biology.

Pauwels K, Willemarck N, Breyer D, Herman P (2012). Synthetic Biology. Latest developments, biosafety considerations and regulatory challenges. Ref: D/2012/2505/46

Rappert B, Gould C. New Security Challenges: Biosecurity. Origins, Transformations and Practices (2009) Ed. Palgrave Macmillan. pg. 250 ISBN 13:978-0-230-22356-1.

Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (2007) A Code of Conduct for Biosecurity. Report by the Biosecurity Working Group. pp. 1-44.

Serrano L (2007) Synthetic biology: promises and challenges. Mol. Syst. Biol. 3, 158.

Sijnesael PC, van den Berg LM, Bleijs DA, Odinot P, de Hoog C, Janssen MWJC, Kampert E, Rutjes SA, Broekhuijsen, Banus S. (2014) Novel Dutch self-assessment Biosecurity Toolkit to identify biorisk gaps and to enhance biorisk awareness. Frontiers in Public Health; 2 (198):1-5.

Schmidt M and Pei L. (2011) Synthetic Toxicology: Where Engineering Meets Biology and Toxicology. Toxicological sciences 120(S1), S204–S224.

Suk JE, Bartels C, Broberg E, Struelens MJ, Ozin A (2014) Dual-use research debates and public health: better integration would do no harm. Frontiers in Public Health 2(114):1-4.

Sundqvist B, Allard Bengtsson U, Wisselink HJ, Peeters H, van Rotterdam B et al. (2013) Harmonization of European Laboratory Response Networks by implementing CWA 15793: Use of Gap Analysis and an “Insinder” Exercise as Tools. Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense, Strategy, Practice and Science; 11(S1):36-44.

Tumpey TM, Basler CF, Aguilar PV, Zeng H, Solórzano A, et al. (2005) Characterization of the Reconstructed 1918 Spanish Influenza Pandemic Virus. Science;310(5745):77-80.

Wain-Hobson S (2014) The irrationality of GOF avian influenza virus research. Frontiers in Public Health 2(77):1-4.

Wimmer E, Mueller S, Tumpey TM, Taubenberger JK (2009) Synthetic viruses: a new opportunity to understand and prevent viral disease. Nat. Biotechnol. 27, 1163-1172.

Yong E (2012) Mutant-flu paper published. Nature 485, 13-14.


Documents accessed online,  March 2015

CEN Workshop Agreement 15793:2011 (CWA 15793:2011):

Center for Infectious Disease and Research Policy: Review panel finds CDC weak on lab safety

Cooperation Agreement concerning Biosafety, Belgium. Belgian Biosafety Server.

Do-It-Yourself Biologist:

ECDC, CDTR: The accidental release of 45 litres of concentrated live polio virus solution into the environment – Belgium:

House of Commons (2008) Innovation, Universities, Science and Skills Committee: Biosecurity in UK research laboratories. Sixth Report of Session 2007–08, HC 360-1, Volume I. Report, together with formal minutes:

HSE final report on potential breaches of biosecurity at the Pirbright site 2007:

POLICY BRIEF (Nov 2011) Implementing biosecurity in (bio-)scientific research in the Netherlands.

D Stemerding, K Murdock, B van der Meulen, F Brom, Rathenau University:

Inter Academies Panel (IAP) declaration (2007):

Laboratory-acquired Infections, Belgian Biosafety Server.

Laboratory Biorisk Management CWA (CEN Workshop Agreement) 15793:2008 revised in 2011:

Miller S and Selgelid MJ. Ethical and philosophical consideration of the dual-use dilemma in the biological sciences. Dordrecht NE, Springer 2008. Report prepared by the Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics, at the  Australian National University for the Australian Department of Prime Minister an Cabinet National Security Science and Technology  Unit, November 2006.

REGULATION (EU) No 388/2012 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 19 April 2012 amending Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual-use items:

Reuters, 31 December 2014 : CDC to hire lab safety chief after Ebola, bird flu mishaps

The Guardian, 4 December 2014: Revealed: 100 safety breaches at UK labs handling potentially deadly diseases.

The Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (Biosecurity Committee), advisory report: “Improving biosecurity assessment of dual-use research”. ISBN 978-90-6984-678-1. Pdf available at:

U.S. National Academies, National Research Council, Committee on Research Standards and Practices to Prevent the Destructive Application of Biotechnology. Biotechnology research in an age of terrorism. Washington DC, The National Academies Press, 2004.

The Virtual Biosecurity Centre (VBC) Is a global multi-organizational initiative founded in 2011 and spearheaded by the Federation of American Scientists, focuses on SynBio but not only. The VBC is a valuable source for biosecurity information, education, best practices, and collaboration.

WHO “Biorisk Management – Laboratory Biosecurity Guidance”: WHO/CDS/EPR/2006.6:

WHO, 2010. Responsible life sciences research for global health security. A guidance document. WHO/HSE/GAR/BDP/2010.2:

Yong E (2012). The risks and benefits of publishing mutant flu studies. Nature News & Comment.